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Executive Summary
Private sector companies are likely to play a major role in the construction of high-speed rail lines in the United 
States. Even as California nears construc-
tion of the nation’s first high-speed rail 
line, however, it remains unclear just 
how the private sector will participate in 
building out the nation’s high-speed rail 
network.
Publ ic-pr ivate par t nersh ips— or 
“PPPs”—have come to play an important 
role in the construction of high-speed rail 
lines around the world. In a PPP, the public 
and private sectors are supposed to share 
the risks, responsibilities and rewards of 
infrastructure development.
The experience with high-speed rail 
PPPs around the world, however, has been 
mixed. While PPP arrangements have 
brought private capital and expertise to the 
task of building high-speed rail, PPPs have 
also resulted in cost overruns, government 
bailouts, and other serious problems for 
the public.
America must learn from these experi-
ences and pursue PPPs only in situations in 
which they make sense—and do so in keep-
ing with a series of key principles designed 
to protect the public interest.
Public-private partnerships will 
likely be part of the development of 
high-speed rail in the United States. 
•	 High-speed rail systems require bil-
lions of dollars in financial capital, 
which cash-strapped state and fed-
eral governments are likely to seek 
through partnerships with the private 
sector. 
•	 California is moving forward with the 
creation of the nation’s first true high-
speed rail system, and it is required 
by ballot initiative to obtain private 
investment in the project.
•	 Amtrak is seeking to involve private 
investors in its plan to bring true 
high-speed rail service to the busy 
Northeast Corridor.
•	 The U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion has signaled that private invest-
ment will play a key role in achieving 
President Obama’s goal of linking 
80 percent of the U.S. population via 
high-speed rail by 2035.
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All high-speed rail public-private 
partnerships require substantial public 
investment.
•	 No modern high-speed rail line has 
ever been built with only private 
capital. In several recent and current 
European high-speed rail PPPs, the 
public sector has been responsible for 
more than half the capital cost of the 
high-speed rail line.
No two public-private partnerships 
are alike.
•	 There are countless varieties of high-
speed rail PPPs, meaning that each 
such partnership is unique and must 
be evaluated on its own terms.
Public-private rail partnerships have 
the potential to unlock access to private 
capital, expertise, technology and econo-
mies of scale, and can also help mitigate 
the risk of high-speed rail projects to 
taxpayers. However, PPPs also come with 
a number of risks and costs, including: 
•	 Higher costs for capital, as well as 
costs related to the profits paid to 
private shareholders. 
•	 Heightened risk for the public once a 
project has begun, due to the ability 
of private-sector actors to hold proj-
ects hostage and demand increased 
subsidies or other concessions from 
government.
•	 The costs of hiring and retaining the 
lawyers, financial experts and engi-
neers needed to protect the public 
interest in the negotiation of PPP 
agreements and to enforce those 
agreements over time. 
•	 Loss of control over the operation of 
the high-speed rail line, which can 
result in important transportation as-
sets being operated primarily to boost 
private profit rather than best advance 
public needs.
•	 Delays in the early stages of a project, 
as government and private partners 
engage in the difficult and complex 
task of negotiating PPP agreements. 
High-speed rail PPPs and efforts 
toward rail privatization abroad have a 
mixed track record.
 
•	 In Taiwan, the government’s efforts 
to pursue a fully private-sector built 
and financed high-speed rail line fell 
apart—despite rising ridership—as 
the private company responsible for 
building the line faced a financial 
crisis caused by its reliance on high-
cost debt. The Taiwan government 
ultimately stepped forward to bail out 
the company and refinance its debt.
•	 In the Netherlands, a series of prob-
lems led to massive cost overruns 
in the construction of a high-speed 
rail line, most of which became the 
responsibility of the government. The 
PPP process was characterized by il-
legal collusion among bidders for the 
construction contracts, poor coordi-
nation among the various contracts, 
and unexpected delays that required 
the government to provide emergency 
bailouts.
•	 In Great Britain, an effort to priva-
tize the operation of the nation’s 
rail infrastructure led to a decline 
in the system’s safety. Excessive use 
of contracting, coupled with poorly 
designed incentives, caused delays in 
the response to known safety prob-
lems and a massive backlog of critical 
maintenance projects—problems that 
contributed to a deadly train accident 
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in 2000. In the wake of that accident, 
the formerly private infrastructure 
provider was reorganized as a govern-
ment-regulated non-profit.
•	 Portugal engaged in thoughtful 
development of a PPP strategy for 
construction of its high-speed rail sys-
tem. However, Portugal’s high-speed 
rail program still required a large 
investment of public resources and the 
nation may be responsible for paying 
financial compensation to its private 
sector partners if it pulls back on its 
high-speed rail construction plans in 
the midst of a devastating financial 
crisis.
Public officials should use a set of 
common-sense principles to evalu-
ate public-private partnerships—and 
should refuse to pursue PPPs that do 
not serve the public interest.
The principles that should guide gov-
ernment’s approach to high-speed rail 
PPPs are:
1) Governments must only pursue 
PPPs for the “right” reasons, such 
as the ability to deliver a public project 
for lower price or with higher qual-
ity—rather than use PPPs to avoid 
budgetary discipline or compliance 
with labor standards or other regula-
tions governing public projects.
2) PPPs must deliver added value 
for the taxpayer, as measured by a 
comprehensive test that includes all 
the relevant costs of a high-speed rail 
project.
3) PPPs must align private sector 
incentives with public sector goals, 
ensuring that private sector partners 
experience penalties and rewards that 
forward the public’s interest in timely 
and cost-effective completion of the 
project and effective and safe  
operation.
4) PPPs must only be pursued where 
ample competition exists for the 
service being put out for bid. 
5) PPPs must only be pursued by 
competent, well-prepared govern-
ments with the ability to defend the 
public interest in contract negotiations 
and to properly monitor and enforce 
contracts as they are carried out. 
6) There must be clear public ac-
countability in PPP projects, with 
one government agency responsible 
for overseeing the project and hold-
ing contractors accountable for their 
performance. 
7) The public must retain control over 
key transportation-system deci-
sions, ensuring that high-speed rail 
lines are built and operated in ways 
that are consistent with the public 
interest rather than the maximization 
of private profit. 
8) PPP projects must not impose 
unreasonable limitations on fu-
ture government action, such as the 
“non-compete” clauses in some toll 
road leases that forbid government 
from improving other nearby trans-
portation facilities.
9) PPP contracts should be of reason-
able length, with contracts for the 
operation and maintenance of long-
lasting infrastructure being longer 
than contracts for trains, communica-
tions equipment and other items with 
faster turnover. 
10) There must be complete transpar-
ency in the PPP contracting pro-
cess and in the execution of PPP 
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contracts. When there is a conflict 
between public right to be informed 
and private investors’ confidentiality 
rights, the former should prevail.
Government agencies considering 
PPPs should understand that even well-
crafted PPPs are not a panacea—and 
that a strong government commitment 
to the project is likely necessary to 
draw productive private investment. 
Specifically:
•	 Governments should be prepared to 
undertake extensive early planning 
and environmental review of a project 
before submitting it to bid, in order 
to reduce project uncertainties and 
increase the comfort of private actors 
in submitting competitive bids.
•	 Governments should be prepared to 
reduce the risk of cancellation of a 
project mid-stream by providing full-
funding grant agreements that provide 
a multi-year commitment of govern-
ment funds.
•	  Governments should acknowledge 
that public investment is necessary 
for the completion of a high-speed 
rail project and understand that even 
“private” rail proposals are likely to 
impose public costs, particularly in 
the event of a threatened private-sec-
tor default.
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America’s emerging push to build high-speed rail has taken its share of lumps in the past year. Newly elected 
governors in Ohio, Wisconsin and Florida 
shelved rail projects for which billions of 
dollars in federal funding had already been 
allocated, while congressional negotiators 
have imposed significant cuts to the federal 
high-speed rail program.
These setbacks—difficult though they 
may be—are likely only temporary. Rising 
oil prices, increasingly crowded highways 
and airports, and the demands of a 21st 
century knowledge economy all demand 
that the nation pursue improved passenger 
rail service, including the construction of 
new high-speed rail lines.
California is now poised to build the 
nation’s first true high-speed rail line, with 
construction on the first segment of the 
line due to begin in 2012. As California’s 
high-speed rail system moves ahead, the 
discussion has begun to turn from the 
question of whether to build high-speed 
rail to the question of how to build it. 
 Among the most important of the issues 
that must be resolved—both in Califor-
nia and in other high-speed rail projects 
around the country—is the question of 
how best to divide roles between the public 
and private sectors. The multi-billion dol-
lar cost of high-speed rail lines provides a 
powerful incentive for government agen-
cies to find private-sector partners willing 
to share in project financing and in the 
assumption of risk. These public-private 
partnerships—or PPPs—have become 
common around the world as a means 
of building large infrastructure projects, 
including high-speed rail lines. But the 
experience with PPPs in the development 
of high-speed rail has been decidedly 
mixed—characterized by both apparent 
successes and grand failures.
It is not too soon for the United States—
and especially California—to learn from 
the experiences of high-speed rail PPPs 
abroad, to develop principles that will en-
able public officials to determine whether 
a PPP is the right way to approach a par-
ticular project, and to structure PPP agree-
ments that protect the public interest.
Introduction
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The United States is in need of new transportation solutions. Our high-ways and airports are increasingly 
congested, making travel, even between 
cities just a few hours apart, inconvenient 
and frustrating. Meanwhile, our reliance 
on oil continues to threaten our economy, 
our national security, and our environ-
ment. 
High-speed rail is a potential solution 
to many of these challenges. Americans 
are excited about the prospect of a clean, 
efficient new means of travel; nearly two-
thirds of Americans support federal or state 
funding for high-speed rail.1 
But the American people aren’t the 
only ones enthusiastic about high-speed 
rail. Businesses from around the globe 
are eager to compete for the billions of 
dollars in infrastructure spending that 
will accompany the nation’s investment in 
high-speed rail. 
In 2009, 30 companies from around the 
world committed to establish a presence 
or expand their existing presence in the 
United States if they are chosen to supply 
components for high-speed rail.2 Prior to 
its cancellation, the Florida high-speed rail 
line attracted interest from seven teams 
including dozens of firms from around the 
globe.3 In California, a request for expres-
sions of interest from private firms drew 
more than 1,000 responses, while 22 funds 
have expressed interest in financing part of 
the system’s construction.4 
The construction of high-speed rail in 
the United States will inevitably involve 
both the public and the private sector. Ef-
fective “partnerships” between the public 
and private sectors are critical if the nation 
is to get the high-speed rail network it 
deserves at a price it can afford. 
Public-Private Partnerships 
and their Role in  
High-Speed Rail
The term “public-private partnership” 
(PPP) is vague. In the broadest sense, it can 
be construed to include almost any part of 
the economy. In the most commonly used 
sense, however, PPPs are arrangements in 
Public-Private Partnerships:  
What They Are and Why They Matter
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which government and private sector firms 
share in a project’s risks, responsibilities 
and rewards. 
PPPs are distinguished from tradi-
tional government contracting in that the 
private sector partner is more integrally 
involved in a project’s development and 
execution than as a “contractor for hire.” 
Private-sector firms might be involved in 
helping to design a piece of infrastructure, 
finance it, or operate it once construction 
is complete.
In the American context, there are two 
types of public-private partnerships that 
are likely to come into play in development 
of the nation’s high-speed rail network. 
The first type involves partnerships be-
tween the government and the owners of 
existing freight railroads that are proposed 
for upgrades in the federal high-speed 
rail program. Many of the initial high-
speed rail projects approved for funding 
under the 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) fit into this 
category, representing incremental im-
provements in service on existing rights 
of way owned by incumbent freight rail-
roads. Any attempt by the government to 
encourage high-speed rail service on these 
existing lines will likely require regula-
tions paired with government provision 
of either subsidies or capital investments 
to entice freight railroads to accommodate 
high-speed passenger services on their 
tracks. 
These partnerships—while critical to 
the development of an effective passenger 
rail network for America—are not the fo-
cus of this report. Instead, we focus here on 
the use of public-private partnerships for 
the construction of high-speed rail lines 
on new rights of way. 
These projects—which include the 
California high-speed rail network, the 
proposed construction of a true high-
speed rail system in the Northeast, and the 
previously proposed Florida network—are 
likely to be the most expensive projects in 
the development of the nation’s high-speed 
rail system, but also the projects with the 
greatest impact. 
It is critical—both for the protection of 
the public purse and for the future of the 
nation’s high-speed rail program—that 
these projects be managed and executed 
effectively. As a result, it is important that 
the nation approach the use of PPPs in the 
realization of these projects with care.
Figure 1. Potential Players, Tasks and Relationships in High-Speed Rail PPPs
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Who Pays for Public-Private Partnerships?:  
The Myth of “Privately Funded” High-Speed Rail
Government officials and the media sometimes believe that privatization enables the public sector to get something for nothing—brand-new infrastructure paid 
for entirely through private-sector investment. In the case of high-speed rail, there 
has been no such thing as a fully privately funded modern high-speed rail line any-
where in the world. 
Recent high-speed rail lines built or begun in Europe have typically required 
government entities to pay more than half the costs of the project. For instance:
•	 The Netherlands’ HSL-Zuid line —which links Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 
the Netherlands to Belgium—relied on the public sector for 86 percent of its 
budget. 5
•	 The Perpignan-Figueres high-speed rail connection between France and Spain 
benefited from a public investment of 57 percent of project costs.6 
•	 The initial segment of Portugal’s high-speed rail network is projected to be 
built with 55 percent of its budget coming from public sources.7
•	 The new Tours-Bordeaux high-speed rail line in France will be built with 50 
percent public investment from France and the European Union.8
Even projects that were originally intended to be fully privately financed—such as 
Great Britain’s High Speed 1 line and Taiwan’s high-speed rail system—eventually 
benefited from heavy government investments in the form of loan guarantees and 
the purchase of partial or full ownership of the companies that built the lines. 
As American policy-makers consider how to finance future high-speed rail in-
vestments, they must remember that PPPs do not provide a “free lunch.” The capi-
tal-intensive nature of high-speed rail development—coupled with the difficulty of 
projecting future ridership—means that private investors are unlikely to take on the 
full financial responsibility of building a high-speed rail line. 
Public investment in high-speed rail has been necessary everywhere it has been 
built. Often, however, that public investment can be justified by the myriad long-term 
public benefits—economic, environmental, energy security-related and more—that 
accrue from high-speed rail construction. 
Public-Private Partnerships 9
Models of Public-Private 
Partnerships
As noted above, the term “public-private 
partnership” is vague, and can be used 
to describe many different types of rela-
tionships among public, quasi-public and 
private sector firms. Indeed, the number 
of possible combinations of participants, 
relationships and divisions of responsibility 
in PPPs is sufficiently vast as to make every 
such arrangement unique. 
The Players
At first blush, the definitions of “public” 
and “private” in a public-private partner-
ship seem clear: a “public” entity is the 
government; a “private” one a corporation. 
In reality, however, there are a variety 
of potential players in PPPs—some of 
which fall into the hazy middle ground of 
“quasi-public” organizations, which blend 
the attributes of public and private sector 
entities. 
Among the potential players in a PPP 
are the following:
•	 Government agencies: Govern-
ment agencies can play two roles in 
PPPs: as investors and participants. 
All high-speed rail projects in other 
countries involve public investment of 
some kind. Indeed, it is not uncom-
mon for several different governmen-
tal entities to invest in a high-speed 
rail project—in Europe, for example, 
the European Union and individual 
nations often invest resources together 
in high-speed rail (sometimes with 
additional contributions from local 
governments), and the same can be 
expected for state and federal govern-
ments in the United States. Far fewer 
projects, however, involve govern-
ment agencies as the direct builders or 
operators of high-speed rail systems, 
with those roles often being left to 
government-owned corporations (see 
below). China is perhaps the prime 
example of government participa-
tion in high-speed rail construction. 
In China, all rail projects (including 
high-speed rail) are carried out by a 
government ministry.9 The construc-
tion and maintenance of the lines are 
usually paid for with public funds or 
government bonds. 
•	 Government-owned corporations: 
Government-owned corporations—
sometimes called state-owned 
enterprises—are by far the most 
common drivers of high-speed 
rail construction internationally. 
These are organizations that are 
accountable to the government but 
operate as businesses. Amtrak in 
the United States is an example of a 
government-owned corporation10, as 
are the state-owned railways in many 
nations that have taken leadership 
in the development of high-speed 
rail, such as those in France, Spain 
and Germany. While government-
owned corporations are often heavily 
influenced by government in their 
core business activities, they often 
have latitude to branch out to other 
lines of business or to the provision of 
rail service in other countries.
•	 Non-profit corporations: A less-
common participant in rail opera-
tion is the state-chartered non-profit 
corporation. The main example of 
this type of “player” is Great Britain’s 
Network Rail, which manages the 
nation’s conventional rail infrastruc-
ture. Network Rail acts as a non-profit 
agency, funneling all revenues from 
its management of the country’s rail 
infrastructure back into stations 
and tracks. Non-profit corporations 
can also act as investors in for-profit 
high-speed rail operations—Britain’s 
High Speed 1 rail line, for example, 
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is currently operated by a consortium 
that includes the Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Plan.11
•	 Private corporations: Private cor-
porations—accountable primarily to 
their shareholders—are also potential 
participants in high-speed rail opera-
tions. In Japan, the Shinkansen high-
speed rail network (much of which 
was built by Japan National Railways 
during its days as a government-
owned firm) has been privatized, with 
six large, regional, privately-owned 
companies responsible for operating 
high-speed rail service. 
•	 Joint ventures: Finally, any of the 
above categories of actors may join 
forces in a joint venture, which itself 
can be a party to a PPP. In the Neth-
erlands, for example, the concession 
for operation of trains on the HSL-
Zuid high-speed rail line was granted 
to a joint venture called High Speed 
Alliance, 90 percent of which is owned 
by the state-owned Dutch national 
railway, NS, and 10 percent of which 
is owned by Air France-KLM.12 An 
arrangement between the Dutch gov-
ernment and a firm 90 percent owned 
by the Dutch government, therefore, 
holds the appearance of a public-pri-
vate partnership, but is actually closer 
to a public-public partnership.
The Tasks
The construction and operation of a high-
speed rail line is a massive logistical, engi-
neering and construction feat, involving 
the organization of vast amounts of capital 
and thousands of laborers in a complex ar-
ray of tasks over the course of many years. 
The tasks involved in building a high-speed 
rail line can all be the responsibility of a 
single entity, or they can be distributed 
among many participants. 
The necessary steps in the construction 
of a high-speed rail line include:
•	 Finance: High-speed rail lines are 
typically multi-billion dollar projects 
that require the assembly of capital 
from a variety of sources, including 
various government entities, publicly-
owned firms, and private investors. 
High-speed rail lines are complex systems, involving the construction of civil engineering works, 
the laying of tracks, the operation of trains and stations, and the development of effective signal-
ing, communications and safety systems. Credit: flickr user mostlybytrain, photo used with 
permission.
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The responsibility for financing a 
high-speed rail line may be carried 
out by the government or assigned to 
a private entity as part of a larger PPP.
•	 Design: Design of a high-speed rail 
line includes decisions on routing and 
station location, as well as techni-
cal specifications of civil engineering 
works (grading, tunnel boring and 
bridge construction), tracks, signaling 
and stations. Public entities typi-
cally engage in at least some level of 
design—at minimum, choosing the 
route—even in projects in which 
private-sector entities are responsible 
for detailed design. In addition, gov-
ernment agencies are typically re-
sponsible for reviewing the design for 
consistency with environmental and 
other regulations, often with a large 
degree of public input.
The Ingredients of a High-Speed Rail System
Another dimension of complexity in high-speed rail PPPs is the division of labor for construction of the system. A high-speed rail line may be seen either as a single, 
integrated entity, or as a collection of “ingredients” for which the responsibility can 
be split among a number of contractors. Among the ingredients of high-speed rail 
projects are:
•	 Civil engineering works: These are the basic public works over which a high-
speed rail line travels, including the graded rail bed, tunnels and bridges.
•	 Tracks: These are the physical structures of the rail line, including rails and 
power systems. 
•	 Communications and signaling: These are the systems that enable rail service 
to operate safely over a given set of tracks, including communications, signaling 
and train protection systems.
•	 Stations: Including related amenities such as parking lots, restaurants and shops.
•	 Rolling stock: Including the high-speed trains themselves and other mainte-
nance equipment.
•	 Maintenance facilities and equipment
A final “ingredient” of high-speed rail service might be called “systems.” Each of 
the above categories represents a set of tangible assets that must be built, maintained 
and operated individually for a high-speed rail system to run smoothly. However, 
these categories do not include the information and other components that enable 
these assets to mesh together as a coherent system—for example, scheduling, ticket-
ing, coordination of maintenance schedules, and management. 
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•	 Construction: Construction of a 
high-speed rail line includes basic 
civil engineering work, laying of track 
and installation of power systems, 
design and implementation of control 
systems, supply of rolling stock, and 
construction of stations. 
•	 Maintenance and operation: Each 
of the physical components of the 
rail must be both maintained in good 
working order and operated on a day-
to-day basis. These tasks can all be 
managed by a single entity, or may be 
undertaken by separate entities. For 
example, in Europe, the task of main-
taining and operating the entire train 
system has historically been central-
ized in state-owned railways. More 
recently, however, European nations 
have separated the task of maintaining 
and operating the physical infrastruc-
ture of their rail systems from the 
task of operating train service, and are 
in the process of opening the latter 
task up to competition. (See ”Beyond 
PPPs: Open Competition in European 
Rail Service,” page 13.)
The Relationships
PPPs can be arrayed on a spectrum from 
those that are “more private”—that is, 
closer to the experience of full private own-
ership—to those that are “more public.”
Private construction and ownership: 
At the most “private” end of the public-
private spectrum are projects in which the 
role of the government is limited to provid-
ing regulatory oversight (or in some cases, 
financial subsidies) to private-sector build-
ers of high-speed rail. Historically, this 
is how much of the U.S. railway network 
was built in the 19th century, with private-
sector companies—sometimes benefitting 
from government subsidies or other forms 
of assistance—laying the tracks and pro-
viding service. In the United States, the 
DesertXpress high-speed rail line between 
Victorville, California, and Las Vegas has 
been proposed as an entirely privately 
owned and operated system, though it may 
benefit from government subsidies, includ-
ing access to federal loans.13
Concessions: traffic-based: A conces-
sion is a grant of permission for a private 
firm to build and operate an asset—and 
collect revenues from that asset—for a 
fixed period of time and/or until other 
conditions in the contract have been met. 
In these agreements, concessionaires use 
the revenue stream from their operation 
of the facility or service to pay off debts 
incurred in the construction of the line 
and to pay for ongoing maintenance and 
operation of the system.14 
There are many varieties of concession 
agreements, but for the purpose of evaluat-
ing high-speed rail PPPs, they fall into two 
categories: those in which the concession-
aire’s revenues are based on the usage of 
the line—which we’ll call “traffic-based” 
concessions—and those in which they are 
not. “Traffic-based” concessions often take 
the form of build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
projects, in which a firm is granted a con-
cession to build and operate a high-speed 
rail line, financing its investment with 
payments from riders, and then returning 
the project to the government when the 
concession expires. 
In Taiwan, for example, the same firm 
that built the high-speed railway also oper-
ated revenue service on the line. But there 
are also traffic-based concessions in which 
the rail builder does not operate train ser-
vice, but rather charges tolls—or “access 
fees”—to other companies that run train 
service on the line. An example of this ar-
rangement is the Perpignan-Figueres rail 
line that links the rail systems of France 
and Spain. The line was commissioned by 
the national railways of France and Spain, 
operating as a joint venture, and was built 
by a consortium of private firms represent-
ing both nations. The concessionaire took 
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Beyond PPPs: Open Competition in European Rail Service 
Public-private partnerships represent one way to tap the skills of private-sector firms in the provision of high-speed rail service. European nations, however, are 
taking the additional step of opening some aspects of rail service to market competi-
tion between existing state-owned railroads and/or private train operators. These 
developments have little relevance for the United States, which is just now building 
its high-speed rail network. However, they are often mentioned in discussions about 
rail “privatization” in the United States, and are therefore worth discussing.
Historically, Europe’s railways have largely been built by state-owned firms, which 
also operated train service on those lines. Beginning in the early 1990s, however, the 
European Union issued a series of directives intended to change the way rail service 
was provided on the continent by mandating “open access” to rail lines. As opposed 
to the traditional arrangement in which state-owned firms could claim exclusive 
rights to run trains on their own tracks, the new system would operate more like the 
provision of intercity bus service over the highway network, in which any firm could 
provide train service, so long as it paid the appropriate access fees to the owner of 
the tracks and met other government standards.
The first result of this shift has been the separation of many former state-owned 
railways into distinct organizations devoted to providing rail infrastructure and 
operating rail service.
In some cases, as in France, this separation has resulted in the creation of separate 
companies. France created a new, state-owned infrastructure management company, 
French Rail Network (RFF), which is “responsible for capacity allocation, contract-
ing, traffic management, and maintenance, although it subcontracts the traffic man-
agement and maintenance to the passenger rail operator, [SNCF].” 17 RFF owns all 
intercity rail infrastructure in France except stations, which are retained by SNCF.18 
RFF collects track access fees, which are approved by the Ministry for Transport, 
from SNCF and other rail operators who wish to use the network.19 
In Germany, the infrastructure and rail operations functions are carried out by 
separate subsidiaries of the same firm, Deutsche Bahn (DB), a state-owned company. 
The company is divided into five large subsidiaries that handle track infrastructure, 
ticketing and sales, regional services, long-distance services, and freight.20 
To date, open access has not resulted in a great deal of competition for high-speed 
rail service. For example, although DB’s tracks have theoretically been open to compe-
tition since 1994, the company’s inherent advantages have led to only a small amount 
of private competition, limited mainly to regional service.21 In France, international 
high-speed rail service is currently provided by Eurostar and Thalys, which are 
consortia of which the state railway, SNCF is a major shareholder.23 
There have been substantial political and technological barriers to broader in-
ternational competition, but the European Union has been chipping away at those 
barriers for years, leading to the prospect of private firms competing with traditional 
state-owned firms—and state-owned firms competing with one another—to provide 
high-speed rail service to Europeans.
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on financial risk in the venture in exchange 
for permission to operate the line’s infra-
structure for 53 years and charge tolls 
on every passenger and freight train that 
crosses the tracks at rates established in the 
concession agreement.15 
Concessions: availability payments: 
The second major form of concession 
agreement relies on fees called “availability 
payments” to pay back the private invest-
ment in a high-speed rail line. Under an 
availability payment concession, the firm 
that builds the line is also responsible for its 
maintenance and operations over the length 
of the concession period. Rather than the 
private entity recouping its investment in 
the line through fares or other revenues, 
however, it receives regular “availability 
payments” from the government, contin-
gent on meeting specified benchmarks for 
the availability of the line.
Some high-speed rail projects combine 
both kinds of concession agreements. The 
HSL-Zuid high-speed line in the Nether-
lands, for example, used separate consortia 
for the construction and operation of the 
rail system itself and the operation of the 
train service on the line. The conces-
sion for construction, maintenance and 
infrastructure operation was issued for a 
25-year term, with the vendor scheduled 
to receive availability payments from the 
Dutch state, while a separate consortium 
won a concession to operate revenue service 
on the line.16 
Public tender contracts: Public tender 
contracts are contracts for specific services 
for which vendors are paid specific sums. 
This is the traditional way in which pri-
vate-sector entities have engaged in the 
construction of public infrastructure in the 
United States and is how most high-speed 
rail lines in the world have historically been 
built. In these arrangements, governments 
or state-owned railways retain overall re-
sponsibility for planning and operation of 
the system, but hire contractors for specific 
jobs—for example, the construction of a 
bridge or design and implementation of a 
signaling system.
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Public-private partnerships are often touted as providing unique benefits above and beyond those that can be 
achieved through government action alone. 
At their best, PPPs merge the specific 
capabilities of public and private sector 
organizations. Additional benefits from 
using PPPs, however, are not always real-
ized in practice—and poorly designed PPP 
arrangements can expose the public to an 
array of financial and public policy risks. 
Public officials considering PPPs must 
therefore evaluate specific proposals and 
vendors carefully to ensure that promised 
additional benefits are realized. 
Potential Benefits of PPPs
Risk Sharing
One of the most important potential 
benefits of public-private partnerships is 
the ability to share the risk inherent in a 
major capital investment among a variety 
of public and private actors. High-speed 
rail l ines are typically multi-billion 
dollar endeavors subject to a variety 
of risks—from unexpected difficulties 
building tunnels through mountains or 
densely packed urban areas to delays in the 
completion of adjoining transportation 
infrastructure. Sharing risks between 
government and private entities can—if 
done correctly—make it more palatable 
for both entities to “take the leap” in 
building a project with great benefits for 
society. 
PPP agreements can share risk in a 
variety of ways:
•	 In a public tender contract, private 
contractors are held liable for build-
ing a piece of infrastructure—often at 
a particular price and on a particular 
schedule.
•	 In an availability payment (design-
build-maintain) concession, private 
contractors are held accountable for 
quality workmanship by also being 
given responsibility for maintaining 
the line over a period of time.
•	 In a traffic-based concession agree-
ment, private entities take on the risk 
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that ridership, and therefore revenue, 
on the high-speed rail line will be less 
than anticipated.
The potential for risk sharing is one of 
the primary selling points used by PPP 
proponents to encourage public-private 
partnerships—and is a particularly pow-
erful selling point at a time of tight fis-
cal constraints. However, the ability of a 
PPP to shelter the government from risk 
depends on the details of the agreement. 
Evidence from abroad shows that even spe-
cific contract provisions designed to protect 
the government from risk may fail to do 
so because the fate of the project becomes 
inexorably tied to the fate of a particular 
private company—a problem known as 
“lock-in.” (See page 17.) 
Advantages in Speed, Cost or  
Quality
PPPs are often touted as being able to de-
liver infrastructure projects faster, cheaper 
or with better quality than a public-sec-
tor entity. This is not to say that private 
entities are inherently better suppliers 
of infrastructure than public agencies. 
Private entities bring many inherent dis-
advantages, including higher capital costs 
and the need to cover financial returns to 
shareholders. The process of undertaking 
a PPP also incurs transaction costs—such 
as the potential need to pay stipends to 
would-be bidders to help defray the cost 
of preparing proposals.24 States and locali-
ties that have pursued toll road PPPs in 
the United States, for example, typically 
pay millions to auditing, consulting and 
legal firms.
A key question for government agencies 
considering PPPs is the degree to which the 
savings purportedly delivered by private 
companies are real or illusory. Real savings 
can result from a private company’s access 
to expertise and experience, its ownership 
of proprietary technologies, or economies 
of scale. In the case of high-speed rail, 
there are several international firms that 
have amassed decades of experience in the 
construction and operation of high-speed 
rail lines, and may be effective competi-
tors to build similar systems in the United 
States.
However, PPP savings can also be il-
lusory if savings are merely generated by 
avoiding labor and wage requirements or 
regulatory standards that would otherwise 
govern projects built directly by govern-
ment agencies. These changes might 
produce a nominal cost “savings” in the 
short run, but they are achieved by exter-
nalizing costs onto or transferring benefits 
from other residents and employees in the 
state rather than by adding unique value 
that can only be delivered by the private 
sector. 
To assess whether a PPP approach 
delivers added value to taxpayers, govern-
ments must carry out a “value for money” 
test, such as the public sector comparator. 
These tests are intended to determine 
whether a PPP or traditional public-sec-
tor contracting will deliver the greatest 
value, taking into account quality, price 
and risk. 
Access to Capital
Access to capital is not typically a strong 
suit of private entit ies. Government 
agencies are capable of borrowing large 
amounts of money to finance public infra-
structure at relatively low cost. However, 
in the current atmosphere of constrained 
public budgets, access to private capital 
may make the difference between build-
ing necessary high-speed rail projects and 
leaving them on the drawing board for 
years to come. 
Because of the multi-billion dollar price 
tag of most high-speed rail projects, gov-
ernments in both Europe and the United 
States have stated that private investment 
will be necessary to build out their high-
speed rail networks. 
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Potential Problems of PPPs
High and Volatile Capital Costs
Private companies have higher long-term 
borrowing costs than public entities. Ac-
cording to analysis by Dennis Enright 
at NW Financial Group, an investment 
bank, public sector costs in 2007 for rais-
ing capital through debt were a full 35 
percent less than the lowest cost a private 
entity could hope to obtain.25 Other aca-
demic studies confirm these consistently 
higher private capital costs.26 And since 
the recession it has become relatively more 
expensive for the private sector to borrow 
capital compared with the public, with 
U.S. government debt remaining at near 
rock-bottom interest rates.
Because government officials can is-
sue tax-free bonds and bond traders are 
willing to accept lower interest rates 
on public bonds, deals based on private 
capital are inherently more expensive 
than public financing. When investors 
purchase stocks or other forms of equity 
in private infrastructure companies, they 
take on greater risk than if they purchase 
private infrastructure bonds; therefore, 
they expect even higher rates of return. 
Thus, regardless of whether private 
companies raise capital through debt or 
equity, their costs will be higher than 
public financing. 
Another key credit-related risk of PPPs 
is the possibility that the cost of credit 
will increase—or that credit will dry up 
entirely—midway through a project. A 
private entity’s inability to obtain capital, 
or to obtain capital at the cost anticipated 
when the PPP was originally devised, can 
jeopardize the entity’s ability to carry out 
the project—leaving the government re-
sponsible either for bailing out the private 
entity or taking over the project mid-
stream. Such a situation occurred with 
the construction of Taiwan’s high-speed 
rail line. (See page 21.) 
Lopsided Allocation of Risk
Governments that engage in PPPs often 
do so in the hope of sharing the risks of a 
project with a private partner. However, 
the very nature of PPPs often leads to a 
lopsided allocation of risks that leaves the 
public sector on the hook when unexpected 
problems arise in a project. 
Public and private entities come to PPPs 
with inherently different motivations: the 
government to deliver a given infrastruc-
ture project on time and with the lowest 
possible public outlay, and the private 
partner to maximize profit. The initial 
negotiation of the contract is the time at 
which the public sector has maximum le-
verage, with the ability to choose the best 
of a competing set of bids from private 
entities. Once a PPP bidder is chosen and 
a contract is signed, however, the balance 
of power shifts. The government entity 
remains accountable to the public for de-
livering the project on time, and becomes 
dependent on the private partner to meet 
that objective, giving the private partner 
leverage in subsequent renegotiations of 
the contract. 
Once a project is initiated, the ultimate 
source of leverage for a private sector firm is 
the threat that the entity will go bankrupt 
or walk away from a project—leaving the 
governmental partner with an unfinished 
infrastructure project it may be ill-equipped 
to complete. Once a project is seen as 
moving forward, decision-makers will 
make budgetary and infrastructure plans 
under the assumption that the PPP will be 
completed, increasing the disruption and 
costs for the government side to exit the 
process. Poorly written PPP contracts may 
give private-sector partners other points of 
leverage: including the ability to slow down 
work or change the terms of delivery of 
the high-speed rail service. Even in cases 
where the language of a PPP contract may 
appear to be clear-cut, the mere threat of 
protracted litigation, arbitration or delays 
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may be enough to force concessions from 
the government. 
This situation—known as “lock-in” 27—is 
not dissimilar to the situation faced by the 
U.S. government during the financial crisis 
of 2008, in which the government faced 
the difficult choice of bailing out banks 
or allowing them to fail, risking the onset 
of a second Great Depression. When PPP 
projects become “too big to fail”—or when 
it is too difficult to replace an incumbent 
firm mid-project—then risks that the 
public sector thought it was avoiding may 
instead be magnified. 
Lock-in is a particular problem with 
high-speed rail PPPs because renegotiation 
of contracts is so common. High-speed rail 
projects are incredibly complex, meaning 
that it is nearly impossible for contract 
writers to anticipate every possible con-
dition that will arise over the course of 
the project. When circumstances change 
and contracts must be renegotiated, new 
opportunities emerge for private firms 
to exert leverage over their public sector 
partners.28 
There are ways to reduce the threat of 
lock-in. One is to eschew PPPs for projects 
that are too big or too important to fail.29 
Another is to structure PPPs in such a 
way as to ensure that no individual vendor 
becomes indispensible to the project. In 
addition, PPP contracts can be written to 
require private-sector actors to post bonds 
guaranteeing completion of the project,30 
to purchase insurance or establish escrow 
accounts against certain risks, to create 
clear expectations for which parties are 
responsible for certain types of unantici-
pated changes (e.g. changes in applicable 
safety standards), and to establish clear 
processes for dispute resolution and con-
tract renegotiation. 
Monitoring and Complexity 
PPP deals also create significant legal and 
monitoring costs for governments. Devel-
oping and implementing a PPP agreement 
requires the participation of an army of 
financial analysts, lawyers, and experts in 
infrastructure development. Even after 
a contract is signed and work begins on 
a project, expert consultants are needed 
throughout the contract term to interpret 
the contract and potentially litigate to en-
sure that the private operator is upholding 
the terms of the deal. These ongoing costs 
to government are rarely considered as part 
of the cost of a PPP project.
Coordination Issues
Successful high-speed rail services are 
more than just trains running on tracks. 
They are the confluence of many sys-
tems—from power supply and train control 
to ticketing and station operations—all 
working together seamlessly. In traditional 
state-owned railways, these systems were 
designed and operated under a single 
corporate roof. PPP-based project deliv-
ery plans, however, can include dozens 
of individual contracts for various pieces 
of the high-speed rail system. Failures of 
coordination among the various contract 
holders can result in unplanned costs or 
quality concerns. Ensuring that contrac-
tors coordinate their efforts can also add 
another monitoring and enforcement bur-
den for the government agency initiating 
the PPP project.  
In addition, because high-speed rail is 
generally built one line at a time, rather 
than as a completed network, new lines 
must be integrated seamlessly into the 
broader network. Dividing the ownership 
or operations of multiple lines within a 
network among different firms has the 
potential to impose new challenges in en-
suring that the system works as a cohesive 
whole. 
Loss of Control
A PPP arrangement involves a swapping 
of risk for control. In a traffic-based con-
cession agreement (in which the private 
partner uses the revenue from high-speed 
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rail service to pay for the cost of building 
the line), the government theoretically 
sheds a great deal of risk, but also provides 
the private company with a greater deal of 
control over how a high-speed rail line is 
operated. This is because private entities 
are less willing to depend on revenues 
from ticket sales and other user fees to 
recoup their investment unless they feel 
protected against government actions that 
might curtail those revenues. Availability 
payment concessions (design-build-main-
tain) on the other hand continue to expose 
government to ridership risk, but also give 
the government greater control over how 
the high-speed rail line will operate.
The public faces dangers that a PPP 
may create a publicly subsidized piece of 
infrastructure that is primarily used to 
serve the profit-maximizing purposes of a 
private entity in ways that conflict with the 
public interest. The most obvious example 
of this tension arises in the setting of ticket 
prices. A private concession operator will 
tend to want higher-priced tickets as a way 
to maximize their revenue for shareholders, 
even if higher ticket prices depress total 
ridership and therefore diminish the posi-
tive public impact of the route. 
The concessionaire for construction of England’s 
High Speed 1 line was forced to charge above-
market access fees to recoup its investment. 
The British government later took over the 
company, a move intended to expand the use of 
the line. Credit: Darnell Ibraham
A similar example occurred in the 
development of Great Britain’s first high-
speed rail line, High Speed 1, which was 
built by London & Continental Railways 
(LCR) under a concession agreement 
with the British government.31 In an ef-
fort to maximize revenue and pay back its 
debts, LCR assessed track access charges 
to companies providing rail service on the 
line that were higher than commercial 
rates and were thought to be high enough 
to make it unprofitable for would-be com-
petitors to offer service on the line.32 Had 
the situation continued, the public interest 
imperatives of maximizing the use of the 
infrastructure would have run headlong 
into LCR’s financial imperative to maxi-
mize revenue. As it turned out, the British 
government—which had already agreed to 
guarantee LCR’s debt—took formal con-
trol of the company in 2009 and entered 
into a new PPP for operation of the line.33 
By taking full ownership over LCR, the 
British government made it possible to 
offer lower track access charges and gain 
greater use of the high-speed rail line, 
though at the cost of absorbing much of 
the risk it thought it had offloaded to LCR 
in the first place. 
Delays at Front End of Project
PPPs often promise to complete construc-
tion faster than publicly built projects—in 
part because penalties for late delivery 
included in PPP contracts drive improved 
performance by contractors. The differ-
ence in speed, however, often depends on 
when one starts the clock. PPP projects are 
often more difficult to get off the ground 
than publicly built projects, especially if 
they are conducted with due diligence and 
proper input from stakeholders.
The first hurdle in building a project 
using PPPs is to design one that is at-
tractive to private investors while also 
satisfying public interest objectives. This 
can be difficult. The Perpignan-Figueres 
high-speed rail line connecting France 
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and Spain—often considered a successful 
PPP—is one example. Preparation of the 
concession agreement began in 2000, with 
publication of the request for bids in July 
2001. One year later, in July 2002, the bi-
national agency responsible for building 
the line chose a preferred bidder, only to 
walk away from negotiations in early 2003, 
citing “unacceptable” conditions demanded 
by the private sector bidders.34 The collapse 
of negotiations forced the contract to be 
opened for bid once again. The final con-
tract was issued in early 2004 and financial 
close on the deal was not accomplished 
until February 2005.35 The ability of the 
bi-national agency to hold firm during 
the first set of negotiations helped protect 
the public against an inadequate deal, but 
it also resulted in a significant delay in the 
start of the project.
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Public-private partnerships have in-creasingly played an important role in the construction and operation of 
high-speed rail systems around the globe. 
What lessons can be learned from the 
experiences of other nations?
In this section, we review four case stud-
ies of PPP or privatization efforts abroad. 
Two of the case studies—in Taiwan and 
the Netherlands—are cautionary tales 
illustrating that the purported benefits 
of PPP arrangements, particularly the 
sharing of risk, are not always realized 
in practice. The case study from Britain 
looks beyond the realm of high-speed 
PPPs to examine the risks of infrastructure 
privatization more generally, specifically 
the conflict between profit-making and 
protection of the public interest inherent in 
privatization. Our fourth case study, from 
Portugal, describes how reliance on PPPs 
can reduce a government’s ability to react 
to fiscal challenges, even if the PPP agree-
ments themselves are designed to avoid the 
mistakes of the past.
Taiwan:  
Taxpayers Find Themselves on 
Hook for “Privately Built”  
High-Speed Rail Line 
By many measures, Taiwan’s high-speed 
rail line, which links the island nation from 
north to south, has been a success. Between 
2006, the year prior to the launch of high-
speed rail, and 2009, the number of passen-
ger-miles traveled by train in Taiwan had 
increased by 56 percent, while the number 
of passengers on domestic air service had 
dropped by 53 percent.36 By 2009, high 
ridership on its densely populated routes 
allowed the company that built the line to 
start turning an operating profit.37
Taiwanese taxpayers, however, are pay-
ing a higher price for that success than 
had been anticipated. Once promised that 
private capital would pay the entire cost 
of constructing the line, Taiwan taxpay-
ers have instead been asked to pick up a 
significant part of the tab. 
In 1998, the Taiwan High Speed Rail 
Corporation (THSRC) was awarded a 
35-year concession to build and operate 
Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR), partially 
based on THSRC’s promise to build the 
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system without government capital. But 
the company began to run into difficulty 
after the Asian financial crisis in the late 
1990s, when it was forced to take out loans 
with high interest rates in order to pay for 
the project.38 
Like a homeowner saddled with an ad-
justable rate mortgage, the high-interest 
debt soon became financially unsustain-
able, with more than three-fifths of the 
company’s net income used to pay off these 
loans.39 As late as 2009, the company was 
still paying a high 8 percent interest rate 
on some of its loans.40 In addition, the 
company was forced, as a result of its status 
as a concessionaire, to depreciate the value 
of its assets much faster than it would have 
under traditional forms of ownership, add-
ing to the financial woes that caused the 
company to post annual losses that totaled 
$2.18 billion by 2009.41
Because of the ongoing financial losses, 
“THSRC shareholders signaled reluctance 
to invest further in the project, which has 
led to difficulty for THSRC in securing 
financing from banks as well,” according to 
a report by the Utah Foundation.42 A lack 
of financing led to problems with finishing 
the project, and when the network opened 
to the public in 2007, several key stations 
were incomplete.
In order to keep the system operating, 
the government refinanced THSRC’s 
loans and contributed hundreds of millions 
of dollars to the network, even though 
the original build-operate-transfer plan 
stipulated that the THSRC build the 
system without any government capital. 
The government has opted not to take 
over the company, expressing no interest 
in growing its current 40 percent share 
or investing money beyond the bailout.43 
The private-sector builder of Taiwan’s high-speed rail line initially pledged to build the system with 
no public investment. An accumulation of high-cost debt, however, ultimately led to a government 
bailout. Credit: Yueh-Hua
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However, to help “persuade creditors to 
issue loans to the THRSC at interest rates 
that will allow it to remain solvent,” the 
THSRC has elected a new chairwoman, 
backed by the government, allowing “the 
government more of a supervisory role in 
the company.”44
The Taiwan example illustrates several 
important challenges of PPPs. First, it 
demonstrates the dangers of overreliance 
on private capital. Like many homeowners 
saddled with high-interest debt during the 
subprime mortgage crisis, the THSRC 
was ultimately unable to restore itself to 
financial health, even when high-speed rail 
service began to turn an operating profit, 
due to its earlier legacy of high-interest 
bank borrowing. Financing the project 
publicly from the very start may have 
proven to be cheaper and more stable, re-
ducing the crushing debt load the THSRC 
faced—and possibly reducing the burden of 
the bailout on the government of Taiwan, 
which ultimately refinanced the company’s 
debts anyway. 
Second, the Taiwan example dem-
onstrates the dangers of “lock-in.” The 
Taiwanese government could have allowed 
the THSRC to go bankrupt and operation 
of the high-speed rail line to cease when 
the company ran into financial trouble. 
Doing so, however, would have resulted in 
the abandonment of a critical public asset, 
leaving the government with little choice 
but to prop up the failed business plan of a 
private operator with public funds.
Netherlands:  
Poor Planning Meets Failure  
to Manage Risks
The construction of a high-speed rail line 
involves the mobilization of billions of dol-
lars in capital and thousands of workers in 
a series of highly complex and interrelated 
tasks. The construction of the HSL-Zuid 
high-speed rail line—which links Amster-
dam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands to 
Belgium—demonstrates the problems that 
can arise when the carefully choreographed 
set of actions needed to bring a high-speed 
rail PPP to successful completion goes 
awry.
At the time HSL-Zuid was commis-
sioned, it was the largest PPP rail project 
in Europe. The innovative deal was praised 
in PPP circles, earning notice as the “Eu-
ropean PPP Deal of the Year” in 2001 from 
Project Finance magazine, which extolled its 
“particularly appetizing risk profile.”45 De-
spite its high profile as a PPP, however, the 
HSL-Zuid project relied mostly on public 
funding, drawing on private investment for 
only 14 percent of the project cost.46
From the beginning, however, design-
ers of the HSL-Zuid project made several 
important mistakes that led to cost over-
runs, delays and government bailouts. The 
first major mistake was in the structure of 
the deal itself. Construction of the high-
speed line was broken into three separate 
projects:
•	 The job of building the “substruc-
ture” of the system—the tunnels, 
bridges, and concrete slabs on which 
the track rests—was divided into 
seven packages and given to civil 
contractors. The Dutch government 
judged that it would be unable to 
transfer risks to the private sector 
for substructure construction, and so 
awarded the substructure contracts 
according to traditional contracting 
principles.47 
•	 The “superstructure” concession was 
given to the Infraspeed Consortium, 
which was responsible for designing, 
building, financing and maintain-
ing the system’s tracks, stations and 
signaling for a 25-year period.
•	 The operations concession was won 
by the High-Speed Alliance, a consor-
tium 90 percent owned by the Dutch 
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state railway, NS, and 10 percent 
owned by Air France-KLM.
By dividing up the project in this way—
and negotiating all three sets of contracts 
early in the process—the Dutch govern-
ment wagered heavily on the ability of the 
winners of the contracts to communicate 
well with one another, and to complete each 
segment of the project on time. 
Problems began to surface immediately. 
The bids for the substructure contracts 
were higher than expected, due largely 
to a lack of competition in the Dutch 
construction market. Dutch investigators 
later found that the consortia bidding on 
the substructure projects engaged in il-
legal coordination, though it is unknown 
how much this affected the final bids.48 In 
any event, the total estimated cost of the 
project ballooned to 43 percent higher than 
budgeted.49 Because the Dutch government 
was primarily concerned with completing 
the project within its pre-determined bud-
get, the higher-than-expected bids forced 
the government to make cutbacks in the 
design of the system and to pursue other 
strategies to induce lower bids, including 
the elimination of penalties for late deliv-
ery of the substructure. This left the state 
liable for making payments to the super-
structure and operations contractors in the 
event that the project was delayed.50 
The shift in financial responsibility for 
delays was part of an overall pattern in 
which the state was left liable for project 
risks—defeating much of the purpose of 
the PPP arrangement.51 Indeed, Dutch 
auditors found that the state took on almost 
all the responsibility for cost overruns in 
the original contract.52 The cost control 
benefits of the PPP were also largely un-
realized, as the project far exceeded its 
original budget, costing 55 percent more 
than originally projected.53
The cost overruns were due to a variety 
of factors, including changes in the scope of 
work and poor planning and coordination 
among the various contracts. The interface 
between the substructure and superstruc-
ture contracts proved to be a particular 
problem.54 Infraspeed, the concessionaire 
for the superstructure, based its project 
bid on civil engineering designs that had 
changed during the bid assessment, result-
ing in incompatibilities in the design of 
various components.55 
Fundamental problems also existed 
within the government bodies responsible 
for supervising the contracts. It was al-
leged that the contracts for the system 
were so complex as to be unintelligible to 
the government officials responsible for 
enforcing their terms.56 In addition, two 
separate state agencies were responsible for 
overseeing the project, leading to problems 
determining who was in charge.
Finally, the new high-speed line was 
intended to operate on the emerging Eu-
ropean automatic train control system, the 
specifications for which were not complete 
until late in the process. This resulted in 
a delay in the opening of the line, with 
interim service on the line finally launched 
in September 2009—roughly two years 
late—with maximum speeds of 99 mph. 
Full service at the maximum speed has yet 
to be launched, due to delays in the provi-
sion of the necessary trains.
These delays resulted in yet another 
problem: Due to the delays in obtaining 
trains, the franchise selected to run train 
operations, High Speed Alliance (HSA), 
was forced to start paying access charg-
es—per its concession agreement—without 
being able to run train service, leaving it 
with no revenue from the line.57 The Dutch 
government was forced to make two large 
payments to the company to keep it afloat, 
extended its concession, and waived access 
fees for a few years, to be paid back later 
with interest. Access charges were also re-
duced due to lower-than-anticipated train 
speeds and reduced frequencies.58 
In short, the HSL-Zuid project, con-
sidered an exemplary PPP project at the 
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time the project was launched, wound 
up illustrating, in many ways, how not to 
structure a PPP for high-speed rail. The 
Dutch government’s decision to undertake 
separate contracts for superstructure and 
substructure appears to have been a mis-
take. The lack of effective competition 
among bidders prevented anticipated cost 
savings from being realized, while the lack 
of proper risk management provisions in 
the contract exposed the state to effects of 
cost overruns. Failing to establish a clear 
line of authority for government manage-
ment of the project, and creating what 
was in effect a public-public partnership 
for operation of the line compounded the 
problems.
Great Britain:  
Infrastructure Privatization  
Creates the Wrong Incentives
In Great Britain, the 1980s saw Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher lead a period 
of privatization of formerly nationalized 
industries. By 1993, under her successor, 
John Major, privatization had come to 
the nation’s rail sector. The breakup of 
the former national rail company—Brit-
ish Rail (BR)– resulted in the creation of 
dozens of local and regional rail operating 
companies and separate companies re-
sponsible for specific tasks within the rail 
system. The for-profit company Railtrack 
was created to operate and maintain the 
infrastructure of the system: the tracks, 
signals and stations.
The experiment with for-profit manage-
ment of the nation’s rail infrastructure lasted 
less than a decade, with Railtrack ultimately 
being folded into Network Rail, a non-profit 
corporation operating under direct supervi-
sion of the British government.
Poorly drawn contracts and misaligned 
incentives led to Railtrack’s lack of proper 
management and maintenance of the 
system infrastructure. First, in order to 
increase the “saleability” of the numerous 
maintenance companies created after the 
break-up of the old BR system, the govern-
ment “decided to make Railtrack into a 
contract management operation in which 
essentially all infrastructure work (main-
tenance and rehabilitation) was carried out 
under contract,” according to a report by 
the World Bank.59 Railtrack had no abil-
ity to shape these contracts, however; the 
government established them in advance 
and packaged them with the maintenance 
companies to improve their marketability. 
Additionally, under this system, contrac-
tors—not Railtrack—held responsibility 
for deciding whether maintenance work 
on the track was needed.60
As a result, Railtrack was left without 
the in-house expertise needed to man-
age and supervise its contractors and to 
independently assure the system’s safety.61 
The contracting system also resulted in 
Railtrack and its contractors bickering 
about who was responsible for fixing safety 
problems rather than taking prompt action 
to address them. According to one analysis 
of the British experience with rail privatiza-
tion, “Each had incentives to pass the cost 
of dealing with the problem to each other, 
with the result that meetings were followed 
by letters and letters were followed by 
memos in a sort of caricature of the worst 
kind of bureaucratic buckpassing.”62
Moreover, Railtrack was a victim of 
poorly designed incentives. In an attempt 
to strike a balance between what Railtrack 
would have to charge the train operat-
ing companies (TOCs) to cover its rail 
infrastructure costs and what the TOCs 
could afford to pay to maintain successful 
franchises, the government established an 
access charge regime with “mostly fixed an-
nual charges for each franchise along with 
a relatively small variable charge for actual 
use,” according to the World Bank.63 This 
regime meant that Railtrack’s revenues 
were disconnected from the amount of 
traffic the system carried. Increases in traf-
fic were likely to lose money for Railtrack, 
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as the company would face increased main-
tenance expenses.64 On the other hand, 
because access charges were low, TOCs 
had lots of incentive to run as many trains 
as they could, which dramatically increased 
both congestion and maintenance costs.65
Railtrack’s problems came to a head in 
2000 when a train derailment in the town 
of Hatfield killed four people and injured 
dozens. The Hatfield accident occurred 
when a rail fractured underneath a passen-
ger train traveling at 114 mph.66 Problems 
with the segment of rail that failed had 
been known to the contractor responsible 
for maintaining it for more than a year 
prior to the accident. Subsequent inves-
tigation also turned up a large backlog of 
needed maintenance on the rail system, as 
well as the failure of Railtrack to properly 
implement previous government recom-
mendations to improve its management.67
In the wake of the Hatfield disaster, 
Railtrack ordered a series of speed re-
strictions and emergency repairs and 
inspections that wreaked havoc with train 
service and reliability. More than 165,000 
scheduled trips were canceled during 2001, 
three times the number of the year before.68 
On-time performance collapsed, and the 
company never recovered from the loss of 
confidence by passengers and the British 
government. 
The privatization of Railtrack was 
not the type of arrangement typically 
conceived for rail PPPs, nor did it deal with 
high-speed rail, but it does illustrate several 
important principles about the structure of 
PPPs. First, it demonstrates that it is critical 
in any contracting arrangement—such as 
that between Railtrack and its maintenance 
subcontractors—that the supervising 
entity have the technical ability to ensure 
that contractors are performing their jobs 
adequately, especially when public safety 
is at stake. The same principle applies to 
state agencies responsible for supervising 
the work of contractors in a PPP. Second, 
it shows that the structure of incentives 
matters greatly because private entities must 
be induced to make business decisions that 
benefit the public interest. The financial 
incentives experienced by Railtrack—a 
publicly traded company—clearly did not 
align with the public interest. Even the 
former head of Railtrack, Gerald Corbett, 
acknowledged in an interview with the 
BBC that “there is a tension between 
shareholder interests and public service 
obligations. The only way we can make 
profits is by not doing the things we should 
do to make the railways better.”69 
Portugal:
Will PPPs Leave the Public  
Holding the Bag Amid a  
Fiscal Crisis?
Portugal is situated next to one of the 
world’s high-speed rail leaders, Spain. Yet, 
nearly two decades after the completion of 
Spain’s first high-speed rail line in 1992, 
Portugal remains without high-speed rail 
service.
Over the past decade, Portugal has 
developed a plan to build a high-speed 
rail line, which would link its major cities 
with the Spanish network. In develop-
ing its approach to the project, Portugal 
consciously sought to avoid many of the 
pitfalls of earlier rail PPPs. However, with 
the nation in financial crisis, Portugal may 
wind up saddled with liabilities to private 
partners, but with little else to show for its 
high-speed rail efforts. 
Portugal assigned responsibility for 
planning and construction of the high-
speed rail network to a company specifi-
cally created for the purpose, called RAVE, 
which was co-owned by the government 
and the Portuguese state railway.70 RAVE 
(which was recently dismantled in the 
wake of the country’s financial crisis) 
was established in 2000 and spent years 
devising the physical plan for the system, 
concluding preliminary studies and en-
vironmental reviews, and developing the 
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business plan for high-speed rail prior 
to the system being put out to bid.71 The 
years of study and advance preparation 
were believed to be critical to reducing 
the number of uncertainties in advance of 
the bidding—creating more confidence in 
private investors to enter bids and compete 
with one another on price.
In determining how to divide up PPP 
projects, nations face competing impera-
tives—dividing the project into too few 
(and too large) pieces reduces the number 
of companies capable of competing for the 
business, stifling competition and adding 
to the risk of “lock-in.” Dividing the project 
into too many pieces, on the other hand, 
increases the number of interfaces among 
different sections of the rail line, leading to 
potential problems with coordination. 
RAVE ultimately opted to break its 
high-speed rail construction program into 
six separate PPP projects, five of which 
are projects to build complete sections of 
the high-speed rail line, with one national 
contract for signaling and communications 
over the entire network.72 According to an 
analysis by the accounting firm KPMG, 
RAVE conducted an analysis to ensure 
that “six PPP projects would represent 
an optimum balance between generating 
private-sector interest while minimizing 
the number of interfaces between projects 
and contractors.”73
The business plan paid a great deal of 
attention to the structuring of incentives to 
ensure that they align with public interest 
imperatives. For example:
•	 The builders of each section of rail 
were to be paid back over the 40-year 
period of the concession through 
availability fees, which places the  
Portugal is seeking to build a high-speed rail line that will link with the extensive high-speed rail 
system built by neighboring Spain (above, a Spanish train passes by a castle in Córdoba). However, 
Portugal’s high-speed rail ambitions may be derailed by the country’s financial crisis, potentially 
leaving the nation liable for paying compensation to its private partners. Credit: Renfe Operadora, 
Dirección de Comunicación, Marca y Publicidad 
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incentive on the companies to do 
high-quality construction and to 
maintain the availability of the tracks 
over a long period of time. In addi-
tion, about 2 percent of the compensa-
tion was to be tied to the amount of 
traffic carried on the line, providing 
the infrastructure company with an 
incentive to work closely with the 
company operating rail service to 
maximize traffic.74
•	 In the agreement for the first section 
of high-speed rail—the Poceirão-Caia 
segment—major project-related risks 
and hurdles were clearly identified and 
consciously split between RAVE and 
the private partners. For example, the 
risk of changing technical specifica-
tions was addressed by adopting broad 
guidelines in the concession agree-
ment with a determination of final 
specifications at a later date.75 The 
state, meanwhile, took on responsibil-
ity for purchasing the rolling stock, 
which will be transferred to the oper-
ating company once it is chosen.76
Portuguese officials claim that their 
advance preparation, clear division of risks, 
and decisions on how to divide the project 
will result in major cost savings. Using the 
public sector comparator test (see page 31), 
RAVE claims that the PPP will cost 40 
percent less than it would have if built by 
the public sector, and notes that the cost 
of the project decreased over the course of 
planning and bidding, rather than going 
up. If completed as planned, the system 
would be one of the least expensive in the 
world.77
However, the PPP approach still left 
the Portuguese government on the hook 
for a major share of the project’s costs and 
risks. The state was forced to compromise 
on several contract conditions in order to 
satisfy bank lenders and took on itself the 
risk posed by interest rate fluctuation—a 
step believed to be necessary to finance the 
project during the global financial crisis, 
but one that assumes a risk usually borne 
by private-sector actors.78 In addition, the 
line will be built with heavy public invest-
ment, with 55 percent of the project cost 
borne by the Portuguese state and the Eu-
ropean Union.79 The public sector outside 
of Portugal is also expected to take on some 
financial risk in the form of substantial 
loans from the European Investment Bank 
to the private-sector companies building 
the lines.80
One risk that apparently was not fully 
considered, however, was the risk that 
Portugal would have to pull back on its 
commitment to the project as a result of the 
nation’s growing financial crisis. Yet, under 
conditions imposed by a recent Interna-
tional Monetary Fund-European Union 
bailout, new PPP projects—including for 
high-speed rail—are to be suspended. In 
addition, the nation’s existing PPPs—
which Portugal had relied heavily on to 
build public infrastructure projects—are 
to be investigated to find out whether they 
are concealing additional public debt.81 The 
country has also been instructed to look 
for opportunities to renegotiate existing 
PPPs.82
As of this writing, Portugal’s high-speed 
rail program is in limbo, its fate to be de-
termined by its new government, elected 
in June. But Portugal’s decision to move 
forward with a PPP approach could cost the 
nation dearly if it decides to halt its high-
speed rail plans. Private-sector vendors are 
already beginning to clamor for compen-
sation from the Portuguese government 
that could total in the tens or hundreds 
of millions of Euros.83 In addition, a pull-
back from the project would threaten re-
lations with Spain, which is extending its 
high-speed rail network to the Portuguese 
border as part of a bilateral project to link 
the two nations’ capital cities. 
The Portuguese experience illustrates 
several potential pitfalls of PPPs. First, 
Evaluating the Experience Abroad 29
PPPs used for infrastructure investments in 
other areas of the economy may have given 
the Portuguese government a mechanism 
to run up public debt without account-
ability (see page 30), helping to contribute 
to the nation’s crushing debt load. Second, 
Portugal’s use of PPPs is currently reducing 
its flexibility in responding to the financial 
crisis, as the nation risks having to pay 
compensation to private-sector partners 
in the event of the cancellation or slow-
down of its high-speed rail plans. Third, 
Portugal’s experience illustrates that even 
the most thoughtful and well-structured 
PPPs still expose governments to a hefty 
share of project costs and risks. 
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Public-private partnerships can be useful tools for governments to un-dertake large infrastructure projects 
in ways that reduce cost and increase reli-
ability. However, PPPs can also be struc-
tured in ways that impose large risks on 
government and taxpayers, waste money, 
and create incentives that run counter to 
the public interest. 
In previous papers,84 the authors have 
laid out general principles for the use of 
privatization and PPPs in toll roads and 
other public assets. The principles that 
should guide the use of PPPs in high-speed 
rail are quite similar in some ways, but dif-
fer in important respects. 
1: Governments Must Only 
Pursue PPPs for the “Right” 
Reasons
The first rule for entering into any produc-
tive partnership is that you need to know 
what you want to get out of it. Govern-
ments should enter into PPPs only with 
a clear idea of the benefits they hope to 
achieve.
There are good reasons and bad reasons 
to enter into a PPP. As noted earlier, PPP 
proponents suggest that partnerships pro-
vide the opportunity to cut costs, reduce 
public-sector risks, and improve quality 
and timeliness in the delivery of major 
infrastructure projects. Regardless of 
whether these claims are credible in a par-
ticular case, PPP arrangements may also be 
undertaken for other reasons, including:
•	 The ability to evade labor or other 
regulations that pertain to govern-
ment-sponsored construction projects 
by instead placing the project under 
the responsibility of a private actor.
•	 The ability to shift the costs of an 
infrastructure investment “off balance 
sheet,” thereby masking the degree of 
public investment in a project and po-
tentially encouraging the public sector 
to take on projects that would other-
wise fail to pass political muster or to 
accumulate large amounts of hidden 
debt.85
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•	 The ability to pass off politically un-
popular decisions to an unaccountable 
private entity, as has happened with 
toll increases and parking rate increas-
es in the wake of previous privatiza-
tion episodes in the United States.
When governments consider PPPs, 
the public not only deserves the right to 
scrutinize those arrangements, but also to 
understand the government’s rationale in 
pursuing them. Understanding the reasons 
for pursuing a PPP will also help ensure 
that the eventual agreement serves those 
purposes.
2: PPPs Must Deliver  
Identifiable Added Value
Pursuing a project through the use of PPPs 
creates a set of risks for the public sector 
and results in the sacrifice of some degree 
of control over the project. As a result, 
PPPs should only be pursued when they 
deliver added value for taxpayers. 
To determine whether a PPP project will 
deliver added value, governments should 
undertake comprehensive and evenhanded 
financial analyses that compare the costs of 
the project under a PPP versus traditional 
public procurement. In addition, they 
must be willing to walk away from PPPs 
as a procurement mechanism if the test 
shows that the hoped-for savings will not 
materialize.
Many countries subject PPP projects to 
a test called the public sector comparator 
(PSC). The PSC test has been the subject 
of criticism given the potential for small 
changes in the cost assumptions, the factors 
considered, and assumptions about the 
value of money over time to dramatically 
affect the results. In 2002, the assistant 
auditor general at Britain’s National 
Accounting Office went so far as to label 
the test as applied in that country “pseudo-
scientific mumbo jumbo.”86 The potential 
for manipulation of the test is particularly 
great when the government has already 
committed itself to a PPP approach, or 
when the test comes to be seen as a hurdle 
to be surmounted, rather than as a real 
tool for evaluating whether a PPP for a 
particular project makes sense.
In other words, while completing a 
value-for-money test should be a prereq-
uisite for moving forward with a PPP 
project, it is also necessary that the test be 
fair and comprehensive, that it be carried 
out by an agency or organization with no 
vested interest in the outcome, and that 
the analysis include examining how ad-
justments in sensitive assumptions would 
affect results.
3. PPP Contracts Must Align 
Private Sector Incentives 
with Public Sector Goals
The previous experiences of high-speed rail 
PPPs in the Netherlands and Taiwan—and 
with rail privatization in Britain—dem-
onstrate that PPP agreements must be 
structured in ways that reward private 
sector partners for actions that benefit the 
public interest rather than merely assum-
ing a confluence of interests. Contracts 
should instead seek to anticipate ways that 
interests will diverge and take particular 
care to leverage pro-public action, and to 
spell out obligations and dispute resolution 
procedures for those instances.
Recently, the availability payment—or 
design-build-maintain—model has gained 
favor both because it removes ridership 
risk from the private sector, making the 
projects less risky to finance, and because 
it exposes the private sector actor to the 
consequences of the decisions it makes 
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during construction. A poorly or cheaply 
built rail line, it is believed, will cost 
more to maintain over time and be out of 
commission more often. By basing com-
pensation on availability payments and 
requiring private sector operators to take 
on the costs of maintaining the system 
they have built for a particular period of 
time, well-aligned incentives for quality 
construction are put in place from the 
very beginning. The success of this ap-
proach, however, depends on the ability of 
government agencies to monitor contract 
performance, to enforce contract provi-
sions, to prove that any shortcomings are 
the fault of the operator, and, if necessary, 
to replace vendors that consistently fail to 
meet performance standards.
In general, all PPPs should have detailed, 
clear, complete and rigorous standards that 
govern contractor performance, with clear 
criteria for measuring success and failure, 
regular evaluation of performance, finan-
cial consequences for failing to meet the 
designated standards, and clear processes 
for dispute resolution.
4. PPPs Must Only Be  
Pursued in an Atmosphere 
of Competition
Private sector participation in government 
infrastructure projects is only likely to 
be beneficial in cutting costs, improving 
quality, and mitigating risk if private sec-
tor firms are forced to compete against one 
another for the projects. It is also likely to 
be beneficial only to the extent that the 
projects do not become “too big to fail” and 
the state does not become locked into part-
nerships with particular private entities.
PPP projects must be structured in such 
a way as to attract multiple competitive 
bids. In Portugal, for example, the signal-
ing and communications contract was bid 
out on a national—rather than regional—
basis in part based on the assumption that 
there were a limited number of global firms 
willing and able to bid for the contract. In 
the Netherlands, the process of bidding 
out the substructure contracts appeared 
to be competitive, with various consortia 
ultimately winning the contracts. Un-
fortunately, those consortia were largely 
made up of different configurations of the 
same few companies, which pursued anti-
competitive practices during the bidding 
process.87
Breaking high-speed rail projects into 
smaller pieces to enable a variety of firms 
to compete is not without drawbacks, since 
doing so creates additional interfaces re-
quiring coordination among various actors. 
However, it does reduce the chances that 
the state will be “locked in” with a single 
contractor on a project that is “too big to 
fail,” and increases the chances that com-
petition among firms will result in lower 
prices and better quality.
5. PPPs Must Only Be  
Pursued by Capable and 
Prepared Governments
The experience with PPPs abroad suggests 
that governments that enter PPPs ill-pre-
pared and without the in-house expertise to 
understand contracts and monitor contrac-
tor performance are likely to make major 
mistakes—mistakes that have important 
ramifications for the public interest.
Governments need to evaluate honestly 
their capacity to assess and monitor conces-
sion agreements to determine whether they 
can adequately protect their constituents. 
In addition, governments should take the 
time to develop clear and specific plans for 
their high-speed rail networks, conduct 
preliminary studies (including, where 
possible, environmental reviews), develop 
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well thought-through business plans, and 
come to a clear vision of their goals for the 
project before making a final decision as to 
the type of contracting model they will use 
to build the system, much less solicit bids. 
This process takes time, but it is neces-
sary in order to solicit high-quality bids 
and build private-sector confidence in the 
capability of the government to understand 
and manage the project.
The substantial expertise needed to 
protect the public interest in a high-speed 
rail PPP means that government agencies 
considering the PPP approach will be 
called upon to make major investments in 
human resources. While there is a role for 
hiring consultants to aid in this process, 
governments should be prepared to build 
the in-house expertise in law, finance, en-
gineering and other disciplines needed to 
manage a PPP project. 
The issue of human resources in the 
management of high-speed rail is already 
emerging in the United States. A recent re-
port by the California Legislative Analyst’s 
Office suggested that the California High-
Speed Rail Authority may be insufficiently 
staffed to monitor and enforce the many 
contracts that are, or soon will be, under 
its authority.88
The private sector companies that 
engage in PPPs have experts to represent 
their interests in these areas; the public 
should be well represented as well.
6. There Must Be Clear  
Accountability in PPP Projects
The experience of the Netherlands, in 
which no government agency had clear 
responsibility for the execution of the high-
speed rail project, shows that there must be 
clear lines of accountability in the execu-
tion of PPP projects. This is important not 
only to minimize “buck-passing” among 
contractors and government agencies, 
but also to provide a clear face for public 
accountability in the management of the 
project.
Establishing true accountability for 
long-term infrastructure projects is always 
a challenge, since it is rare that the same 
public officials responsible for authorizing 
and designing a project are still around to 
officiate at the ribbon-cutting. But while 
individual accountability is hard to main-
tain, institutional accountability is not. 
Ideally, the job of representing the public 
interest in the construction of high-speed 
rail should be clearly assigned to one entity 
responsible for carrying the project from 
start to finish.
7. The Public Must Retain 
Control over Key  
Transportation-System  
Decisions
When governments invest hundreds of 
millions to billions of dollars in high-
speed rail projects—as they generally do 
regardless of whether a project is built by 
the government or under a PPP—they 
should be able to deliver infrastructure 
that serves the public interest. Yet, in 
cases such as that in Taiwan, or along 
Britain’s High Speed 1 line (see page 19), 
the profit motive of private sector infra-
structure operators has threatened to limit 
the usefulness of a high-speed rail line to 
the public. 
Government has a right—and indeed 
a responsibility—to safeguard the public 
interest in the operation of high-speed 
rail lines, regardless of the structure 
of ownership. This principle has two 
important implications. First, it implies 
that concession agreements that give 
private sector actors untrammeled ability 
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to establish access charges or prices are 
almost always best avoided. PPP agree-
ments should be structured in ways that 
encourage more—not less—ridership on 
a high-speed rail line.
Second, it suggests that the public sec-
tor must retain a strong hand in setting 
policies for the operation of high-speed 
rail service. In well-developed rail mar-
kets, open competition between carriers 
on the same tracks may eventually prove 
to be a workable model for providing rail 
service. Until then, however, the govern-
ment should ensure that the high-speed 
rail asset is managed—through concession 
agreements, regulation, or both—in such 
a way as to provide the greatest possible 
benefit to the public interest, not just the 
greatest possible profit to the rail service 
or infrastructure operator.
8. PPP Contracts Must Not 
Impose Unreasonable  
Limitations on Future  
Government Action
Previous agreements in the United States 
to privatize toll roads and other public 
assets have often come with non-compete 
clauses or compensation event contin-
gencies that prevent public entities from 
pursuing the best policies for the public 
interest. For example, the private lessee of 
a toll road might insist that the government 
not build a competing highway that would 
reduce their revenue.
Non-compete clauses are likely to be 
less of an issue with high-speed rail PPPs, 
except in the case of concession agree-
ments in which the private actor’s profit 
depends primarily on ridership levels. 
For instance, a PPP partner might claim 
that a government-sponsored rideshare 
program along the same corridor or 
improved commuter rail along some seg-
ments reduces its revenues. That may be 
true, but these are indirect risks that the 
public sector should take on. It is reason-
able to stipulate against direct future claims 
on PPP revenue, such as from future ticket 
fees or rail operator taxes; but otherwise 
the public sector should be left free to make 
the proper public policy decisions without 
worrying about lawsuits and paying ad-
ditional costs from indirect “harms” to a 
private partner. 
9. PPP Contracts Should Be 
of Reasonable Length 
Another issue that has arisen in asset 
privatization schemes in the United States 
is the establishment of contract lengths for 
asset leases of as long as 99 years, essen-
tially transferring ownership of the facil-
ity to the private sector. Excessively long 
contracts create two problems: they can 
lock the public into a bad deal essentially 
forever, and they rely on contract-writers 
to anticipate all of the challenges that 
could occur up to a century in advance—
an impossible feat. With the exception 
of the 90-year concession for Britain’s 
High-Speed 1 line (which subsequently 
became moot after the British government 
took over the concessionaire and reissued 
the concession with a 30-year lease), most 
high-speed rail concessions around the 
world have been of lengths ranging from 
15 to 50 years. Generally speaking, avail-
ability payment (design-build-maintain) 
contracts should be of sufficient length to 
motivate the builder to ensure high-qual-
ity construction—recent PPPs have been 
in the neighborhood of 40 to 50 years. 
Contracts for items that have a shorter 
life span or are more likely to be replaced 
soon—such as rolling stock and commu-
nications systems—should be shorter.
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10. PPPs Must Be Subject to 
Extraordinary Transparency
Transparency is a critical component to 
the completion of PPP deals that benefit 
the public interest. Open publication of bid 
packages and other documents can enable 
the public and experts to identify problems 
in proposed PPP agreements before gov-
ernment officials sign on the dotted line. 
Transparency also reduces the potential 
for favoritism and backroom deals in the 
selection of contractors, ensuring that the 
contractors chosen are those who provide 
the best value for the money. In addition, 
transparency enables the public to play a 
watchdogging role in the oversight of proj-
ect cost and to create an outside source of 
pressure on public officials and contractors 
to fulfill their responsibilities.
In addition to ensuring the transparency 
of dealings between the public sector and 
the lead contractor in a PPP deal, the gov-
ernment should also insist on monitoring 
the flow of public dollars to subcontrac-
tors, as well as ensure that subcontractors 
deliver the promised level of service to the 
public.
Inevitably, as in any business setting, 
some details of PPP negotiations will need 
to remain confidential on a temporary 
basis. However, the strong presumption 
should be that all documents produced in 
the course of a PPP process will be made 
available to the public as quickly as pos-
sible, and government agencies managing 
PPP processes must be accountable under 
public records laws.
When Do PPPs Make Sense?
Governments often look at the private 
sector as a knight riding to the rescue of 
infrastructure projects that are imperiled 
by political or budgetary constraints. 
However, the involvement of the private 
sector is not sufficient to turn a bad project 
into a good one. 
Moreover, effective high-speed rail 
PPPs can only result from the active and 
intelligent involvement—including the 
financial commitment—of government 
entities.
Government ent it ies considering 
high-speed rail PPPs must take several 
important steps in order to ensure the 
productive involvement of private-sector 
companies:
•	 Governments should be prepared to 
undertake extensive early planning 
and environmental review of a project 
before submitting it to bid, in order 
to reduce project uncertainties and 
increase the comfort of private actors 
in submitting competitive bids.
•	 Governments should be prepared to 
reduce the risk of cancellation of a 
project mid-stream by providing full-
funding grant agreements that provide 
a multi-year commitment of govern-
ment funds.
•	  Governments should acknowledge 
that public investment is necessary 
for the completion of a high-speed 
rail project and understand that even 
“private” rail proposals are likely to 
impose public costs, particularly in 
the event of a threatened private-sec-
tor default.
Are PPPs Really Worth It?
The debate over public-private partner-
ships often gets swept up in broader 
ideological debates about the proper role 
of government. To some conservatives, 
the private sector is often considered more 
efficient and more capable by definition. To 
some liberals, private sector involvement in 
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public works is inherently suspect.
With high-speed rail, the experience 
of public-private partnerships abroad 
suggests that PPPs are neither beneficial 
nor detrimental by their very nature. If a 
government agency seeking to launch an 
infrastructure project is sure in its goals, 
well prepared and strategic—and if it is for-
tunate enough to enter a market brimming 
with competent, competitive firms eager 
to win their business—a public-private 
partnership can be an effective way to get 
the job done. But the many problems and 
pitfalls with PPPs around the globe teach 
us that there are certain public interest 
protections that should never be negotiated 
away, and that the public sector must be an 
aggressive and capable defender of the in-
terests of citizens in any PPP negotiation. 
Critically, they also tell us that the most 
powerful tool available to the public sec-
tor in ensuring that PPPs serve the public 
interest is the ability to walk away. Gov-
ernments should never commit to a PPP 
approach unless they are convinced that a 
PPP is the best way to achieve the goals of 
a particular project—and that a PPP can 
be achieved that comports with the above 
principles. 
As the nation prepares to make a mas-
sive investment in our future in the form 
of high-speed rail, it is important that 
government officials recognize that public-
private partnerships are not panaceas, but 
are merely useful tools that should only 
be pursued under the right conditions and 
with the proper protections for the public 
interest. 
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